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RIGHT OF UNION TO DENY MEMBERSHIP TO APPLI-

A condition of the closed-shop agreement between defendant labor

union and a manufacturing concern required that all new employees of the company be members of the union or become such within twenty-one days. The
company employed plaintiff, but discharged him shortly thereafter when the
union refused to admit him to membership. Plaintiff sought either to enjoin
~he enforcement of the union contract as illegally tending toward a monopoly,
or to compel the union to grant his application for membership. Held, defendant's demurrer sustained, because plaintiff's allegation of a general plan to
monopolize the labor supply was a conclusion not admitted by the demurrer,
and because plaintiff did not make specific enough allegations to show that he
was entitled to union membership as of right. Furthermore the court found no
grounds upon which a union can be required to admit anyone to membership
even though such person is able and willing to comply with all laws and by-laws
of the union. Walter v. McCarvel, (Mass. 1941) 34 N. E. (2d) 677.
Under common law, a labor union, being a voluntary association, has the
inherent power to exclude arbitrarily from membership anyone it so desires.1
Since the closed shop gradually has gained legislative and judicial favor, the
right of unions to govern their own membership has developed into a potential
power for obtaining monopolies of the labor supply and for restricting the employment of qualified workers. Consequently, the need for some governmental
control over the unions' internal affairs has increased, resulting in the enactment
of considerable legislation prescribing the limits of the unions' power to regulate
their own membership. 2 But in the absence of statute, the courts remain

1 Mayer v. Journeyman Stone-Cutters' Assn., 47 N. J. Eq. 519, 20 A. 492
(1890); Greenwood v. Building Trades Council, 71 Cal. App. 159, 233 P. 823
(1925); Murphy v. Hggins, (S. Ct. 1939) 12 N. Y. S. (2d) 913.
2 E.g., a Wisconsin statute, Wis. Laws (1939), c. 57, Stat. (1939), § III.06 (c)
empowers the state labor board to invalidate a closed-shop contract if it finds that the
union unreasonably refused to admit an employee. A Pennsylvania statute, 43 Pa. Stat.
Ann. (Purdon, 1941), § 21 I. 6 ( 1) (c), negative in form, legalizes closed-shop contracts where the union does not deny membership to those then employed by the
company. A New York statute makes it a misdemeanor for a union to exclude any
applicant from membership becouse of race, creed or color. 8 N. Y. Consol. Laws
(McKinney, Supp. 1941), "Civil Rights Law," § 43.
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unanimous in steadfastly refusiug to compel a union to admit a qualified applicant
to membership. 3 The theory behind such judicial forbearance is that the reconciliation of two conflicting parallel rights, the applicant's right to work 4 and
the union's right to exclude from membership, is not an appropriate concern of
the courts, but is a problem for legislative determination. 5 This reluctance to
interfere has been facilitated by holding that a union which arbitrarily denies
membership to certain qualified applicants is not motivated by malice, but rather
by its desire for the betterment of its members. 6 The courts have observed that
judicial exercise of the power to control union membership may undermine the
unions by forcing them to admit persons whose interests may be inimical to the
union, and might influence workers to wait until a period of unemployment
before seeking membership.1 Several alternative forms of relief, nevertheless,
have been granted by courts to protect rejected applicants. A few courts have
given equitable assistance wherever the union's refusal was found to be "unreasonable." 8 In framing their decrees, these courts follow precedent in refusing
to order the union to admit the applicant to membership since the union has a
right to control its membership. Instead, the union's interference with the
8

Williams v. Quill, 277 N. Y. 1, 12 N. E. (2d) 547 (1938); Kemp v. Division
No. 241, 255 Ill. 213, 99 N. E. 389 (1912); Miller v. Ruehl, 166 Misc. 479, 2
N. Y. S. (2d) 394 (1938); Maguire v. Buckley, 301 Mass. 355, 17 N. E. (2d) 170
(1938); Simons v. Berry, 210 App. Div. 90, 205 N. Y. S. 442 (1924); Muller v.
Bricklayers,' Masons,' & Plasterers' International Union of America, 6 N. J. Misc.
226, 140 A. 424 (1928). But in analogous cases of expelled union members, reinstatemen or a money judgment has been awarded. Fleming v. Moving Picture Machine
Operators, Local No. 244, 124 N. J. Eq. 269, I A. (2d) 386 (1938); Spayd v.
Ringing Rock Lodge, 270 Pa. 67, II3 A. 70 (1921). Likewise courts have ordered
unions to advance members from a subordinate status and to accord them full union
rights. Heim v. Screen Actors Guild, 8 I. J. A. Bull. 65 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1940);
Cameron v. International Alliance, II8 N. J. Eq. II, 176 A. 692 (1935), II9 N. J.
Eq. 577, 183 A. 157 (1936). In Walsche v. Sherlock, uo N. J. Eq. 223, 159 A. 661
( 193 2), an injunction was granted against the discriminatory practice of the union
in designating members for employment by a card-index system.
~ While it is often said that there is no absolute right to work [ clearly there is
none if there are no jobs to be had, Warm, "A Study of the Judicial Attitude toward
Trade Unions and Labor Legislation," 23 MINN, L. REv, 255 at 333 (1939) ],
such an argument mistakes the nature of plaintiff's right. The right actually asserted is
not the broad right to work but rather the right to seek employment and to retain
existing employment free from interference by third parties.
15
Kemp v. Division No. 241, 255 Ill. 213, 99 N. E. 389 (1912); Williams v.
Quill, 277 N. Y. 1, 12 N. E. (2d) 547 (1938).
6
See cases cited by Warm, "A Study of the Judicial Attitude Toward Trade
Unions and Labor Legislation," 23 MINN. L. REv. 255 at 293, note 93 (1939). But
whether harm to the applicant is the motive or merely the result of the union's conduct
would seem to be immaterial so long as the union has acted unreasonably or arbitrarily.
7
See Miller v. Ruehl, 166 Misc. 479, 2 N. Y. S. (2d) 394 (1938). But a
union might partially block this danger of "transient" membership by forbidding
members to resign from the union without its consent.
8
Dorrington v. Manning, 135 Pa. Super. 194, 4 A. (2d) 886 (1939); Wilson
v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 123 N. J. Eq. 347, 197 A. 720 (1938).
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plaintiff's employment is enjoined.9 The difficulty of determining whether the
union has been "unreasonable" in refusing to admit an applicant has been urged
as a reason for denying judicial relief in these cases.10 This objection might be
met by requiring an applicant to establish unreasonableness by "clear and convincing evidence." 11 Courts, however, seldom grant this or any other form of relief
except where the union's closed-shop contract or contracts cover such a large
portion of the industry as to make it practically impossible for the rejected applicant to obtain a job in his trade elsewhere in the community.12 Where such
was true, several older cases declared these contracts contrary to public policy
and invalid.13 However, recent Supreme Court decisions indicate that unions
cannot ordinarily be prosecuted, nor the enforcement of their contracts enjoined,
under the federal antitrust laws.14 Another basis for obtaining relief exists when
the rejected applicant is employed by the company at the time the closed-shop
agreement is made, so that enforcement of the agreement violates his contract
of employment. He then has an action against the employer for breach of contract, or against the union for interference with the same.15 Furthermore, it is
possible that the real objective of these suits is not to determine the narrow question whether the union has been unfair in its dealings with the discharged employee, but rather is to test the validity of the closed-shop contract, the employer
being the real party in interest. If such is the case, the motive for the suits is
destroyed when the court declares the contract valid. The problem then becomes one of the desirability of allowing an employer to question the validity of
closed-shop contracts in such a manner, instead of the advisability of controlling
union membership.
David N. Mills
9 The attempt to distinguish the Dorrington and Wilson cases from cases denying
relief on the ground that in the former the applicants were already employed at the
time of the making of the union contract is to mistake the basis of plaintiffs' claim.
For in neither case did the applicant predicate his case on any violation of his rights
under his existing contract of employment, and in neither case would the company's
attempt to carry out the union contract cause it to breach its contract with the applicant. Had the union's insistence on the discharge violated plaintiff's contract of
employment, his right to relief would of course be clear. Sutton v. Workmeister, 164
ID. App. 105 (19u).
10 See 53 HARV. L. REV. 500 (1940); BROOKS, WHEN LA:BoR ORGANIZES 226
(1937).
.
11 As is required in suits brought to reform deeds on the ground of mistake. Cox
v. Woods, 67 Cal. 317, 7 P. 722 (1885); Ward v. Waterman, 85 Cal. 488, 24 P.
930 (1890).
12 As in Wilson v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, 123 N. J. Eq. 347, 197
A. 720 (1939); Polk v. Cleveland Ry., 20 Ohio App. 317, 151 N. E. 808 (1925).
13 Lehigh Structural Steel Co. v. Atlantic Smelting & Refining Works, 92 N. J.
Eq. 131, III A. 376 (1920); Polk v. Cleveland Ry., 20 Ohio App. 317, 151 N. E.
808 (1925); American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U.S.
184, 42 S. Ct. 72 (1921). See also Connors v. Connelly, 86 Conn. 641, 86 A. 600
(1913).
14 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 60 S. Ct. 982 (1940); United
States v. Hutcheson, 312 U. S. 219, 61 S. Ct. 463 (1940).
15 Sutton v. Workmeister, 164 Ill. App. 105 (1911); Dorrington v. Manning,
135 Pa. Super. 194, 4 A. (2d) 886 (1939).

